Australia could have taken earlier action
By Hamish McDonald, in The Age
May 27, 2006
"HOW were events in Dili allowed to get to this point?
Responsibility lies firstly with the East Timorese leadership. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and his Fretilin party colleagues sat back while a third of the 1800-strong army walked off, with their weapons, over small grievances, and then were sacked.
President Jose Xanana Gusmao, the charismatic former resistance leader who has formal command of the military, has also been weak, strangely disengaged from the army split as it festered for three months.
Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato, a former Fretilin exile in Mozambique, where he was jailed for diamond smuggling and once tried to stab his colleague Jose Ramos Horta, runs a factionalised police force.
A whiff of internal Fretilin power play, perhaps an attempt to unseat Alkatiri, hangs around the actions of army rebel Major Alfredo Reinado, who is not entirely aligned with the main body of dismissed soldiers, recruits from the western part of the country.
But where was Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, when this crisis unfolded over three months? Where were the Australian military advisers who, with Portuguese counterparts, trained the East Timor armed forces through to independence in May 2002?
Why was the Howard Government so strongly opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission continuing when its mandate ran out a year ago, apparently persuading the US to support its view?
East Timor's Government was keen for a continuing UN security role. A modest UN presence, focused on guiding the young local army and police forces, might have helped nip this crisis in the bud.
Prime Minister John Howard and Downer have played it tough with the East Timorese since 1999 when an international force led by Australian troops quelled violence by Indonesian troops and pro-Jakarta local militias after the independence vote. The Australian Government screwed them to a hard bargain on the maritime oil revenues then departed too early from the security mission.
There are echoes here of the Howard Government's refusal to send a small body of police to the Solomon Islands in 2000 when requested by its then prime minister. Three years later it had to launch its $2 billion regional assistance mission to revive a collapsed system of government.
Obviously these are independent countries, and intervention has to be requested by their governments. A request from East Timor came only on Wednesday night, and even while the first Australian troops were landing, Alkatiri was haggling over the rules of engagement and force composition.
Alkatiri probably knows or suspects the Dili fighting is aimed at his leadership. The Australian-led intervention, even with the face-saving Portuguese and Malaysian additions sought by Alkatiri, could be a fatal blow.
Howard and Downer will insist on neutrality in politics, but the fact is that what Australia does now will have a big impact on the outcome of the leadership struggle, which might see both Alkatiri and Gusmao pushed into retirement.
Into the bargain, Australia is tying up 1300 soldiers from its overstretched army, which is ready for a sizeable and dangerous commitment to Afghanistan in less than two months as well as staying on in Iraq.
The Government would probably call it a kind of tough love: letting the adolescent nations get themselves into a quagmire of their own making so they then ask for help, rather than offering unwelcome advice. Maybe we could just be more interested. "
Hamish McDonald, a former Age correspondent in Jakarta, Tokyo and Beijing, has reported from East Timor several times since 1975.
By Hamish McDonald, in The Age
May 27, 2006
"HOW were events in Dili allowed to get to this point?
Responsibility lies firstly with the East Timorese leadership. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri and his Fretilin party colleagues sat back while a third of the 1800-strong army walked off, with their weapons, over small grievances, and then were sacked.
President Jose Xanana Gusmao, the charismatic former resistance leader who has formal command of the military, has also been weak, strangely disengaged from the army split as it festered for three months.
Interior Minister Rogerio Lobato, a former Fretilin exile in Mozambique, where he was jailed for diamond smuggling and once tried to stab his colleague Jose Ramos Horta, runs a factionalised police force.
A whiff of internal Fretilin power play, perhaps an attempt to unseat Alkatiri, hangs around the actions of army rebel Major Alfredo Reinado, who is not entirely aligned with the main body of dismissed soldiers, recruits from the western part of the country.
But where was Australia's Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, when this crisis unfolded over three months? Where were the Australian military advisers who, with Portuguese counterparts, trained the East Timor armed forces through to independence in May 2002?
Why was the Howard Government so strongly opposed to the UN peacekeeping mission continuing when its mandate ran out a year ago, apparently persuading the US to support its view?
East Timor's Government was keen for a continuing UN security role. A modest UN presence, focused on guiding the young local army and police forces, might have helped nip this crisis in the bud.
Prime Minister John Howard and Downer have played it tough with the East Timorese since 1999 when an international force led by Australian troops quelled violence by Indonesian troops and pro-Jakarta local militias after the independence vote. The Australian Government screwed them to a hard bargain on the maritime oil revenues then departed too early from the security mission.
There are echoes here of the Howard Government's refusal to send a small body of police to the Solomon Islands in 2000 when requested by its then prime minister. Three years later it had to launch its $2 billion regional assistance mission to revive a collapsed system of government.
Obviously these are independent countries, and intervention has to be requested by their governments. A request from East Timor came only on Wednesday night, and even while the first Australian troops were landing, Alkatiri was haggling over the rules of engagement and force composition.
Alkatiri probably knows or suspects the Dili fighting is aimed at his leadership. The Australian-led intervention, even with the face-saving Portuguese and Malaysian additions sought by Alkatiri, could be a fatal blow.
Howard and Downer will insist on neutrality in politics, but the fact is that what Australia does now will have a big impact on the outcome of the leadership struggle, which might see both Alkatiri and Gusmao pushed into retirement.
Into the bargain, Australia is tying up 1300 soldiers from its overstretched army, which is ready for a sizeable and dangerous commitment to Afghanistan in less than two months as well as staying on in Iraq.
The Government would probably call it a kind of tough love: letting the adolescent nations get themselves into a quagmire of their own making so they then ask for help, rather than offering unwelcome advice. Maybe we could just be more interested. "
Hamish McDonald, a former Age correspondent in Jakarta, Tokyo and Beijing, has reported from East Timor several times since 1975.
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